JWSS - Journal of Water and Soil Science

The most important cause of concern about the stability of bridge foundation is the occurrence of scour around bridge piers. Therefore, different methods have been proposed to prevent or reduce scouring around bridge piers. The use of groynes is one of the modern methods to control and reduce local scour. In the present study, the effect of a solid groyne on reduction of the scour depth around a cylindrical bridge pier, located in the bend of a laboratory flume is assessed. Experiments were conducted for groyne model angled at 50˚, 90˚ and 120˚ to the downstream channel sidewall with three flow rates of 47, 49 and 51 liters per second in a sediment free condition. Results showed that in at ratios of velocity to critical velocity and all groyne angles, in comparison with no groyne, the scour depth was reduced. At all ratios of velocity to critical velocity, the best operation was related to normal groyne and the average operation of repelling groyne was better than attracting groyne. The operation of normal groyne decreased and attracting groyne function improved as the flow rate increased. Also, the normal groyne (ratio of velocity to critical velocity equal to 0.87) had the best effect on reducing the scour depth (by about 71.4 percent).

At the river catchments, different strategies at the whole or different parts of the basin can be applied for water resources management. One of these strategies is optimal water allocation and crop pattern. In this study, an optimization model for water allocation and cropping pattern is presented based on the cooperative game theory. To measure the performance of the developed model, the cultivated area of Ordibehesht Canal in the Doroodzan irrigation network has been studied. First, using a fuzzy model and considering the fuzzy coefficients values in the objective function and constraints, the optimal crop pattern and allocated water has been determined for each crop. Second, benefits of stakeholder’s coalitions have been determined by developing a cooperative game model and based on the structure and properties of the irrigation water distribution network and water rights of each part. Then, the total net benefit has been reallocated to the different stakeholder in a rational and equitable way using Least Core games. The results show that by allocating more water to the sectors with more potential production, more profits are generated and water productivity increases. For example when players cooperate together and form the grand coalition, the net benefit increases from 8.906 billion Tomans to 9.724 billion Tomans that show an increase in the economic productivity of water.